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Resolving Conflicts Over Trans-boundary Rivers Using Bankruptcy Methods : Volume 10, Issue 11 (15/11/2013)

By Zarezadeh, M.

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Book Id: WPLBN0004011582
Format Type: PDF Article :
File Size: Pages 33
Reproduction Date: 2015

Title: Resolving Conflicts Over Trans-boundary Rivers Using Bankruptcy Methods : Volume 10, Issue 11 (15/11/2013)  
Author: Zarezadeh, M.
Volume: Vol. 10, Issue 11
Language: English
Subject: Science, Hydrology, Earth
Collections: Periodicals: Journal and Magazine Collection, Copernicus GmbH
Publication Date:
Publisher: Copernicus Gmbh, Göttingen, Germany
Member Page: Copernicus Publications


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Morid, S., Madani, K., & Zarezadeh, M. (2013). Resolving Conflicts Over Trans-boundary Rivers Using Bankruptcy Methods : Volume 10, Issue 11 (15/11/2013). Retrieved from

Description: Department of Water Resources Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. A bankruptcy approach is proposed for resolving trans-boundary rivers conflicts in which the total water demand or claim of the riparian parties is more than the available water. Bankruptcy solution methods can allocate the available water to the conflicting parties with respect to their claims. Four bankruptcy rules are used here to allocate the available water to the riparian parties. Given the non-uniform spatial and temporal distribution of water across river basins, bankruptcy optimization models are proposed to allocate water based on these rules with respect to time sensitivity of water deliveries during the planning horizon. Once allocation solutions are developed, their acceptability and stability must be evaluated. Thus, a new stability index method is developed for evaluating the acceptability of bankruptcy solutions. To show how the bankruptcy framework can be helpful in practice, the suggested methods are applied to a real-world tarns-boundary river system with eight riparians under various hydrologic regimes. Stability analysis based on the proposed stability index method suggests that the acceptability of allocation rules is sensitive to hydrologic conditions and demand values. This finding has an important policy implication suggesting that fixed allocation rules and trans-boundary treaties may not be reliable for securing cooperation over trans-boundary water resources as they are vulnerable to changing socio-economic and climatic conditions as well as hydrologic non-stationarity.

Resolving conflicts over trans-boundary rivers using bankruptcy methods

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